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Sammendrag:. 
 FNs klimapanel (IPCC) publiserte i 2000 en rapport 
om utslippsscenarier frem til 2100 (Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios, SRES, IPCC, 2000). Etter at Ian 
Castles og David Henderson for to år siden påsto at 
rapportens scenarier var basert på dårlig fagøkonomisk 
håndverk og av den grunn har gitt urimelig høy 
utslippsvekst, har rapporten vært gjenstand for debatt. 
Et sentralt punkt i kritikken fra Castles og Henderson 
var at nasjonale BNP-data ble konvertert til en felles 
valutaenhet ved bruk av markedsbaserte valutakurser 
(market exchange rates, MER). Kritikerne mente man  
i stedet burde korrigert for kjøpekraftspariteter 
(purchasing power parities, PPP). I responsen fra 
IPCC het det blant annet at valget mellom MER og 
PPP kun er et spørsmål om valg av måleskala og er 
like viktig som valget av Celsius eller Farenheit som 
måleenhet i temperaturmåling. I denne artikkelen 
adresseres både kritikken fra Castles og Henderson  og 
responsen fra IPCC. Artikkelen bygger på vårt 
tidligere publiserte argument om at det er misvisende i 
noen henseender å ikke PPP-korrigere i den aktuelle 
kontekst. Men på den annen side mener vi at denne 
feilen ikke har gitt opphav til vesentlig overdrevne 
utslippsfremskrivninger. Likevel konkluderer vi med 
at valget av MER eller PPP som konverteringsmetode 
er langt viktigere enn valget av Celsius eller Farenheit  
i temperaturmåling. Avslutningsvis diskuteres 
hvorvidt SRES-scenariet med den laveste 
utslippsbanen representerer en rimelig nedre grense 
for fremtidige globale klimagassutslipp. 
 
Abstract:  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC)’s Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
(SRES, IPCC, 2000) has been a matter of debate since 
Ian Castles and David Henderson claimed that the 
scenarios were based on unsound economics giving 
rise to improbably high emission growth. A main 
point in their critique was that the scenario-makers 
converted national GDP data to a common measure 
using market exchange rates (MER) rather than 
purchasing power parity rates (PPP). IPCC responded 
to the critique by claiming that the use of PPP or MER 
based measures is just a question of “metrics”, as 
important as the “switch from degrees Celsius to 
Fahrenheit”. This paper addresses both the critique 
from Castles and Henderson and the response from the 
IPCC. It builds on our earlier argument that the use of 
MER-based measures, although misleading in some 
respects, probably have not given rise to seriously 
exaggerated emission forecasts because comparing 
regional income levels by the use of MER has two 
types of implications that draw in different directions 
and effectively neutralize one another. Nevertheless, 
we argue that the choice between MER or PPP in the 
construction emission scenarios is far more than just a 
question of metrics. Finally, we discuss whether the 
SRES scenario with the lowest cumulative emissions 
is a reasonable lower limit with respect to global 
emission growth. 
Språk: Engelsk Language of note: English 
 
Rapporten kan bestilles fra: 
CICERO Senter for klimaforskning 
P.B. 1129 Blindern 
0318 Oslo 
 
 
Eller lastes ned fra: 
http://www.cicero.uio.no
 
The report may be ordered from: 
CICERO (Center for International Climate and 
Environmental Research – Oslo) 
PO Box 1129 Blindern 
0318 Oslo, NORWAY 
 
Or be downloaded from: 
http://www.cicero.uio.no
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Contents   
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
2 Why are PPP - corrections  more than just “metrics”?.................................................................... 1 
3 Two “wrongs” may make a “right” ................................................................................................. 4 
4 The use of PPP in SRES: Are the PPP – based series in SRES “mislabelled”?.............................. 7 
5 Does the B1 scenario represent a lower limit? ................................................................................ 9 
6 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................... 10 
 
Acknowledgements 
This Policy Note is based on our article in Climate Policy 4 (2). We would like to thank Lynn P. 
Nygaard for editing and two anonymous referees of Climate Policy for comments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
CICERO Policy Note 2004:03  
 The use of PPP or MER in the construction of emission scenarios is more than a question of “metrics” 
 
 
                                                     
1 Introduction 
In a series of letters made public during 2002, Ian Castles and David Henderson, C&H in the 
following, criticized the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s Special Report 
on Emissions Scenarios (SRES).1 In this paper we will comment on three points of the 
critique put forward by C&H:  
1. that emission growth was overestimated because national and regional GDP-levels in 
the majority of the scenarios were converted to a common currency by market 
exchange rates (MER) instead of purchasing power parity indexes (PPP-indexes2)   
2. that the information on PPP-corrected measures actually included in SRES was 
“mislabelled”  
3. and that the B1 scenario family, which has the lowest accumulated emissions of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the SRES, may not really represent a lower limit with 
respect to GHG emissions. 
The IPCC responded to the critique from C&H through a press statement 8 December 2003 
(IPCC, 2003). This press statement is characterized by the attitude that the choice between 
PPP and MER is immaterial. It is for example maintained that the economy does not change 
by using a different metrics (PPP or MEX3), in the same way that the temperature does not 
change if you switch from degrees Celsius to Fahrenheit.  
The overall aim of this paper is to argue against this oversimplification. The use of 
purchasing power parity correction is definitely essential in relation to long-term greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emission scenarios. In our view, it is a fortunate coincidence that the application 
of MER-based GDP data did not cause serious overestimation of future emissions in the 
SRES report. This point is addressed in section 2, which also provides some general 
arguments in relation to reasons why purchasing power parity correction is important in 
relation to long-term greenhouse gas (GHG) emission scenarios.  
Sections 3-5 then address each of the points of critique raised by C&H above, respectively. 
Section 6 provides some conclusions. 
2 Why are PPP - corrections  more than just “metrics”? 
Two contributions to the debate related to the SRES scenarios have revealed that the concept 
of PPP correction is not sufficiently understood and accepted. The IPCC press statement of 8 
December 2003 (IPCC, 2003) is one example. The other example is the paper by Manne and 
Richels (2003), which confuse the so-called PPP doctrine, see below, with the methods for 
PPP corrections, cf. Heston (2004).4 It is therefore appropriate at the outset to present some 
basics related to the concept of purchasing power parities.  
On a regular basis The Economist publishes prices of Big Mac hamburgers from a selected 
number of countries converted by market exchange rates to US dollars (the Big Mac Index). 
1 The letters were later published in Energy & Environment (Castles and Henderson, 2003a), see also 
Castles (2004). 
2 Cf. for example Gulde and Schulze-Ghattas (1993). 
3 MEX = Market exchange rate. We denote this by MER in this paper. 
4 Manne and Richels (2003) interpret conclusions related to the dismissal of the PPP doctrine, cf. 
among others Rogoff (1996), and thus, use them as arguments against PPP correction. However, the 
dismissal of the PPP doctrine is an argument in favour of PPP corrections, not the opposite. 
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Table 1 contains some numbers from the Big Mac Index of 23 April 2002. The table 
illustrates to what extent price levels vary substantially across countries, or, put differently, 
the large variations of the purchasing power of a US dollar across countries. 
Table 1. The Big Mac Index. 23 April 2002. 
  Big Mac prices 
 
Local 
currency 
In local 
currency 
In USD 
using MER 
Argentina Peso 2.50 0.78 
China Yuan 10.50 1.27 
Poland Zloty 5.90 1.46 
South Korea Won 3100 2.36 
United States USD 2.49 2.49 
Switzerland SFr 6.30 3.81 
Source: The Economist (2002) 
The original purpose of publishing the Big Mac Index was to provide an informal and 
easily understood guide to likely future changes in market exchange rates. This is based on 
the so-called Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine, put forward by the Swedish economist 
Gustav Cassel, which claimed that “As long as anything like free movement of merchandise 
and a somewhat comprehensive trade between two countries takes place, the actual rate of 
exchange cannot deviate much from this purchasing power parity” (Cassel, 1918, p. 413). To 
put it simply: in the long term, a US dollar should be able to buy the same bundle of goods 
and services everywhere, at least if there is comprehensive trade between countries. Hence, 
according to Cassel’s theory, the Big Mac Index could give some indications about future 
movements in exchange rates.  
Unfortunately, Cassel was wrong. Currently, 86 years later, the price-level differences are 
of the same order of magnitude as they were in Cassel’s time. Theories related to this paradox 
make up the topic of a considerable body of literature; cf. for example Rogoff (1996). One 
important implication is that conversion by market exchange rates is, and probably will 
continue to be, a misleading method if the purpose is to measure and compare output and 
income levels, or emission intensities in production, across countries and regions.  
Table 1 is also useful for the illustration of the term PPP correction. The first column of the 
table shows local-currency prices of a Big Mac. The second converts them into US dollars, 
using MER. The average price of a Big Mac in USA was 2.49 USD in April 2002. The 
cheapest was in Argentina (0.78 USD), while the most expensive were in Switzerland (3.81 
USD). Hence, almost identical products are priced very differently in different parts of the 
world if we use market exchange rates as the basis for price comparisons. The Big Mac index 
does of course not represent any serious research. However, investigations have revealed that 
on a broad basis almost identical products are priced very differently across countries and 
regions. 
The implication of this is that national accounts, which apply prices as weights when 
national production and income levels are calculated, provide significantly misleading 
indicators of for example relative income levels, if GDP levels are converted to a common 
currency using market exchange rates.  
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Table 2. Income level  and emission intensity in three regions.  Measured by MER 
and PPP. Percentage of the OECD level in 1990.  
           GDP/cap          CO2/GDP 
 MER PPP MER PPP 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (REF) 14.0 % 38.4 % 685 % 249 % 
Asia 2.8 % 11.5 % 444 % 108 % 
Middle East, Africa and Latin America (ALM)8.3 % 19.4 % 220 % 94 % 
Source: IPCC (2000). 
Table 2 illustrates further the importance of PPP corrections. The first two columns show 
per capita GDP in three world regions as percentage of per capita GDP in OECD as of 1990, 
measured by using MER and PPP respectively. Because the PPP-corrected GDP levels 
represent the best available estimates of real income differences between the regions, these 
two columns illustrate to what extent the income gap between rich and poor countries is 
overstated by the use of MER.  
In relation to emission scenarios, however, the two last columns are of even greater interest, 
as they show to what extent the emission intensity gaps are overstated by the use of MER. In 
fact the significant emission intensity gap between the OECD and the developing countries in 
1990, which appears when MER are applied, is considerably reduced as PPP data are applied. 
Thus, the potential for technological catch-up in the less developed regions may not be as 
large as the emission intensity estimates based on MER converted GDP numbers would 
suggest. 
In the SRES scenarios, the most important driving force is the income gap between OECD 
and the rest of the world. The importance of an accurate representation of that income gap, 
not least at the starting point of the scenarios, is then rather obvious. From table 2 it is 
apparent that the choice between PPP and MER is essential in the determination of both the 
income gap and the emission intensity gap. It is therefore our view that the statement from 
IPCC that “the economy does not change by using a different metrics (PPP or MEX)” is both 
confusing and misleading. 
It should be clear that both MER- and PPP-based measures should play important roles in 
economic models used for generating long-term emissions scenarios. In general, these models 
contain endogenous variables determined during the simulations, a set of exogenous 
assumptions determined outside the models, and a set of parameters determining the 
behaviour of the economic agents in the models. The parameter values are usually established 
by estimations or calibrations of the model equations to historical data and these are, where 
relevant, expressed in MER. For consistency, the model simulations will therefore often have 
to be carried out using MER to convert to a common unit where necessary.  
However, in designing the scenarios, i.e. in determining the exogenous variables, one is not 
always free to choose between MER or PPP. In the case of SRES, where an important design 
criterion for the scenarios is the income gap closure between the rich (OECD) and poor (non-
OECD) regions, it is intuitively clear, as C&H point out, that interregional comparisons of 
income levels are best done by using PPP. 
However, in reporting the actual output of the models, one is once again free to choose 
either MER or PPP in converting e.g. GDP values to a common unit. 
It is crucial for the debate that the uses of MER and PPP as conversion factors in these 
steps are distinguished. There is no doubt that it is far more than a question of “metrics”. 
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3 Two “wrongs” may make a “right” 
C&H argue that using MER-based GDP-measures makes developing countries generally 
appear to be poorer than they actually are. This is essential in the SRES context because the 
size of the income gap between rich and poor countries is a key driving force in the scenarios. 
A basic premise has been that the income gap has to be considerably reduced by the end of 
the century. Although C&H claim that the assumed degree of gap closure might be too rapid, 
they agree that such a convergence is a reasonable premise for the scenarios. Their main 
objection is that an overstated income gap in 1990/2000 gives rise to exaggerated projected 
economic growth in the poor countries in order to reduce the gap “with corresponding 
implications, other things being equal, for energy use and for CO2 emissions.” (Castles and 
Henderson, 2003a, p. 169).   
In Holtsmark and Alfsen (2005) our concern was that, even if it is accepted that the SRES 
scenarios overstate the GDP growth in the poor countries, it is far from obvious that this 
implies overstated emissions growth in SRES. As concluded in McKibbin et al. (2004a,b), 
whether the use of MER in the SRES scenarios has caused overestimation of future emissions 
depends on the other assumptions made in the scenario construction, not least to what extent 
the technological change is made endogenous by other assumptions and driving forces. C&H 
do not really analyze that question. They just maintain that the SRES scenarios overstate 
emissions growth because “the partial derivative of emissions with respect to output is 
positive, since it is the output – the real GDP and final expenditure – that gives rise to the 
emissions” (Castles and Henderson, 2003b, p. 428).  
In Holtsmark and Alfsen (2005) we argued that there are not one, but two gaps to be closed 
in the scenarios. The first one is the income gap. The second one is the technology or 
emission-intensity gap. Using MER implies an overestimation of the economic growth 
necessary to close or narrow the income gap. On the other hand, it also represents a 
corresponding overestimation of the potential for energy efficiency improvements in the 
developing countries. In other words, the use of MER overvalues the energy efficiency 
improvements that will take place in the developing countries in a process where the 
emission-intensity gap is narrowed. Hence, comparing regional income levels by the use of 
MER has two types of implications that draw in different directions with respect to expected 
emission levels; in fact, they neutralize one another. Holtsmark and Alfsen (2005) thus argue 
that if gap closure is accepted as the driving force behind both economic growth and 
reduction of emission intensities in the non-OECD countries, the use of MER when 
converting national GDP levels to a common currency does not necessarily imply an 
overestimation of future emissions. Although we accept that the use of MER-based data in 
SRES could be criticized, we do not believe that this has led to an overestimated emission 
growth in the poor countries. The reason is that the MER-based data also overstate the 
emission intensities in the poor regions, and consequently also the potential for emission 
reductions in those regions. Below, this argument is illustrated by a numerical example.  
The numerical example relates to the B1 IMAGE scenario, cf. IPCC (2000). We use this 
scenario as a point of departure because C&H (2003a), p. 169, also use this scenario (see also 
Castles and Henderson, 2003b). The numerical example is set out in tables 3 and 4.  We have 
added a foot script in order to clarify whether we refer to GDP measures based on MER or 
PPP.  
There were two noticeable gaps between rich and poor regions in 1990. First, there was an 
income gap as the ratios of per capita GDP in the OECD region to that of the non-OECD 
countries were 20.7 and 8.1 when we apply the MER- and PPP-based GDP measures, 
respectively. Second, there was an emission-intensity gap as the ratios of per GDP unit CO2 
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emissions (tC/103 USD) in the non-OECD region to that of the OECD countries were 4.1 and 
1.6 when we apply the MER- and PPP-based GDP measures, respectively. 5  
The following four key assumptions are important driving forces in the B1 IMAGE 
scenario: 
1. GDPMER per capita of OECD increases by a factor of 3.9 between 1990 and 2100. 
2. The ratio of per capita GDPMER in the OECD countries to that of the non-OECD 
countries drops from 20.7 to 1.9 over the same period. 
3. The emission intensity in the OECD region drops from 171.5 tC/103 USDMER in 
1990 to 13.4 tC/103 USD MER in 2100. 
4. The MER-based emission intensity gap drops from 4.1 to 1.2 by the end of the 
century.  
Table 3. The B1 IMAGE as set out in IPCC (2000) using market exchange rates 
(MER).  B1 IMAGE adjusted using purchasing power parity (PPP). 
  PPP-   Population GDP GDP GDP/Cap.GDP/Cap.CO2  CO2/GDPCO2/GDP
 correction  (MER) (PPP) (MER) (PPP)  (MER) (PPP) 
   106 1012 USD 103 USD/capita 109 tC    tC/103 USD 
1990                   
OECD 1.00 799 16.5 16.5 20.6 20.6 2.83 171.5 171.5 
Non-OECD 2.55 4 480 4.5 11.4 1.0 2.5 3.2 706.2 276.7 
World 1.33 5279 21.0 27.9 4.0 5.3 6.0 285.6 214.6 
Income gap between OECD and non-OECD 20.7 8.1    
Emission intensity gap between OECD and non-OECD   4.1 1.6 
2100 SRES B1 IMAGE (MER-based)     
OECD 1.00 1032 82.3 82.3 79.7 79.7 1.1 13.4 13.4 
Non-OECD 2.55 6016 246.1 628.0 40.9 104.4 4.1 16.7 6.5 
World 2.16 7048 328.4 710.3 46.6 100.8 5.2 15.8 7.3 
Income gap between OECD and non-OECD 1.9 0.8    
Emission intensity gap between OECD and non-OECD   1.2 2.0 
Mean annual growth rates for OECD and Non-OECD regions 1990-2100. Percentage  
OECD 0.0 0.2 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.2 -0.9 -2.3 -2.3 
Non-OECD 0.0 0.3 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.4 0.2 -3.3 -3.3 
World 0.4 0.3 2.5 3.0 2.3 2.7 -0.1 -2.6 -3.0 
OECD refers to OECD as of 1990. Non-OECD includes REF as the reforming economies, i.e. 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. ALM as Africa, Latin America and the Middle 
East and ASIA as Asia excluding OECD countries. 
 
 
                                                     
5 There is no significant emission intensity gap between OECD and the developing countries if PPP-
corrected GDP measures are applied. However, there is a significant emission intensity gap between 
the reforming economies encompassing former Soviet Union and the rest of the world, cf. figure 1. 
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Table 4.  An alternative B1 scenario of 2100 using SRES gap closures and 
purchasing power parity (PPP). 
  PPP-   Population GDP GDP GDP/Cap.GDP/Cap.CO2  CO2/GDPCO2/GDP
 correction  (MER) (PPP) (MER) (PPP)  (MER) (PPP) 
   106 1012 USD 103 USD/capita 109 tC    tC/103 USD 
OECD 1.00 1032 82.3 82.3 79.7 79.7 1.1 13.4 13.4 
Non-OECD 2.55 6016 96.4 246.1 16.0 40.9 4.1 42.5 16.7 
World 1.84 7048 178.7 328.4 25.4 46.6 5.2 29.1 15.8 
Income gap between OECD and non-OECD 1.3 1.9    
Emission intensity gap between OECD and non-OECD   3.2 1.2 
Mean annual growth rates for OECD and Non-OECD regions 1990-2100. Percentage 
OECD 0.0 0.2 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.2 -0.9 -2.3 -2.3 
Non-OECD 0.0 0.3 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.6 0.2 -2.5 -2.5 
World 0.3 0.3 2.0 2.3 1.7 2.0 -0.1 -2.1 -2.3 
 
IPCC (2000) does not provide information on the development of the exchange rates in the 
B1 IMAGE scenario. We have therefore in this numerical example assumed that the PPP-
correction factors are constant from 1990 to 2100.6 In table 3 we have calculated income 
levels and emission intensities measured in GDPPPP terms based on the SRES scenario growth 
rates. 
Suppose now that we instead follow the thinking behind the numerical example set out in 
Castles and Hendersen (2003a, p. 169), and assume that the income gap in 2100 (the 1.9 ratio) 
is applied, but to the PPP-based GDP measures. The economic growth factor (the 3.9 ratio) of 
the OECD region is kept unchanged. The emission intensity gap (the 1.2 ratio) is applied, but 
to the PPP-based intensity measures. This numerical example is set out in table 4. For 
simplicity we report on only the aggregate regions OECD and non-OECD. The result is, in 
accordance with the criticism put forward by C&H, that the world’s GDP in 2100 is reduced 
by almost 50%.  
However, as claimed above, the CO2 emissions are unaffected by the change from MER- to 
PPP-based assumptions. The important point is that the use of MER-based income 
comparisons in 1990 implies that both the income gap and the emission intensity gap are 
overstated. The use of MER-based income comparisons leads to overstated economic growth 
in the poor regions as well as the energy efficiency improvements in these regions. Thus, 
these two inaccuracies cancel each other out. 
For an analytical discussion of this argument, see Holtsmark and Alfsen (2005). 
 
                                                     
6 This is obviously a simplification, as structural changes in the different economies will alter this 
relationship. Furthermore, as the next two sections demonstrate, a reasonable interpretation of the 
SRES scenarios is that they assume that the currencies of the poor regions appreciate against the 
currencies of the OECD regions. Our argument nevertheless holds, cf. Holtsmark and Alfsen (2004). 
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4 The use of PPP in SRES: Are the PPP – based series in 
SRES “mislabelled”? 
In their restated and extended critique of SRES (Castles and Henderson, 2003b), C&H 
responded to the fact that SRES presented a set of PPP-corrected emission scenarios, as 
pointed out by Nakićenović et al. (2003). However, C&H claim that the presented PPP-
corrected emission scenarios have characteristics that are in conflict with what would be 
reasonable properties of soundly based PPP scenarios. We argue that the PPP-based scenarios 
have some reasonable characteristics but that they reveal that the MER-based scenarios are 
based on changing exchange rates. That implies that the MER-based GDP-series in SRES do 
not represent real economic growth because the changing market exchange rates influence 
them strongly. 
Before we discuss the PPP-based series in SRES, a short overview of the different SRES 
scenarios is appropriate. Altogether there are four so-called marker scenarios in SRES. These 
four qualitative storylines – labelled A1, A2, B1, and B2 – illustrate possible futures with 
varying emphasis on material welfare (the A-scenarios) versus concern for cultural and 
environmental values (the B-scenarios), a high degree of globalization (the 1-scenarios) 
versus a more fragmented and regionally self-sufficient kind of future (the 2-scenarios), 
respectively. Within each family of scenarios the simulations share common or “harmonized” 
assumptions on key issues like global population, gross world product, and final energy use. 
Six modelling teams developed a total of 40 SRES scenarios. Only the MESSAGE model, 
developed and operated by IIASA, provides information on assumptions related to PPP-
corrections. It is definitely somewhat surprising that the other five models ignore information 
related to PPP-corrections. However, because the MESSAGE model is applied to each of the 
four scenario families, it is possible for the interested readers of the SRES report to get an 
impression of how PPP-corrections would have changed the four story lines.  
Nakićenović et al. (2003) and Grübler et al. (2004) emphasize that all the MESSAGE 
scenarios provide GDP data based on both PPP and MER. However, C&H (2003b) did not 
accept the PPP corrections of the MESSAGE scenarios and maintained that “the MESSAGE 
GDP series expressed in PPP terms is not such a measure – it is mislabelled”. (Castles and 
Henderson, 2003b, p. 423, second paragraph). A further investigation of the PPP series will, 
from our point of view, reveal that the scenarios are better founded than claimed by C&H. In 
our view some “unsound economics” might, however, be related to the MER-based GDP-
series. 
C&H put forward two arguments for why the PPP corrections of GDP in MESSAGE are 
unsound. First, they claim that the “proportionate changes shown in this series for the OECD 
90 group of countries are identical with those for the MER-based series, which they would 
not be if they were genuine measures of GDP” (p 422). If “proportionate changes” is 
interpreted as growth rates, however, the two series are different. Nevertheless, the 
differences might be too small in relation to what is reasonable, cf. Ryten (2004). However, 
this is probably an inaccuracy related to the level of aggregation and, in our view, does not 
reveal a very serious weakness of the PPP scenarios. 
The second reason C&H claim that the PPP corrections of GDP in MESSAGE are unsound 
is because with respect to GDP measures for the developed and “for the developing regions, 
the divergences between the two series are impossibly great”. (p 423, first paragraph.) This is 
related to the assertion from C&H that “any difference between them can only arise from the 
use of different weighting systems.” (p 422). 
As far as we can see, this claim by C&H is misleading because there is another source of 
divergence that may explain the large difference between the two series – namely price levels. 
The important point is that the scenario makers obviously have assumed that the price levels 
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in the developing countries, measured by MER, converge towards the price levels of the 
OECD region. In other words, the conversion factors using MER and PPP converge. In that 
process, the exchange rates of the local currencies of the developing countries appreciate 
relative to USD. It is also important to note that the GDP series of the developing countries 
are measured in USD at current or nominal MER.7 Due to the large differences in price levels 
in different regions in the base year (1990), that process should imply that the PPP-corrected 
GDP growth in the developing regions is considerably higher than the MER-based growth-
measures in these regions. 
The case can be illustrated by some numerical examples set out by C&H. They point to the 
fact that the GDPMER of the developing countries in B1 IMAGE is projected to increase by a 
factor of 65 between 1990 and 2100. The effect of this is to reduce the ratio of projected 
GDPMER per capita in the industrialized countries to that in the developing countries from 16.7 
to 1.8. (The corresponding numbers for the B1 MESSAGE scenario are 16.1 and 1.7.) 
However, C&H point to the fact that the MER-based ratios are misleading and that the 
PPP-based GDP-ratio of 1990 would have been around 6.2. If this PPP-based ratio has to be 
reduced to the postulated level of 1.8 in 2100, the factor-increase in GDPPPP of the developing 
countries would be 25 rather than 65. If, however, C&H had taken the PPP-corrected GDP-
series as the starting point of their discussion, they would have discovered that 25 is exactly 
the factor by which GDPPPP of the developing countries is increased in B1 MESSAGE. In 
other words, the real GDP of the developing countries is increased by a factor of 25 in the B1-
scenarios, not 65 as claimed by C&H. Hence, in a sense C&H fight against a non-existent 
enemy.   
In line with the above numerical examples, C&H (2003b, pp. 424–427) present a set of 
figures from the SRES-scenarios in order to strengthen their view that the scenarios overstate 
likely economic growth in the developing countries. The argumentation is consequently based 
on MER-based GDP series, while the PPP-corrected GDP series are accordingly ignored. If 
we accept that the MER-based GDP series are based on changing market exchange rates, the 
entire argumentation is unfortunately senseless. The point is that real economic growth in the 
scenarios, which appears only from the MESSAGE scenarios, is considerably smaller than the 
MER-based GDP growth.   
Thus, it is our view that there are reasons to believe that the PPP-series from the 
MESSAGE scenarios are basically well founded, although these series, like all model 
simulations, have their weaknesses and are affected by a series of simplifying assumptions.  
However, if the PPP-series are reasonable, the MER-based series of the non-OECD 
countries have been reported in USD at current or nominal market exchange rates. It is 
important to underline that this mode of reporting can be quite misleading because it means 
that the reported GDPMER series do not represent real income/production changes, but rather 
nominal income/production changes. What is important here is that this concerns all the 
scenarios in SRES, which therefore provides a highly misleading picture and is worthy of 
criticism.8
7 If the conversions instead had been based on a constant exchange rate, C&H would be right. 
8 A comparison of the MESSAGE GDPMER-series will show that they are quite similar to the 
corresponding GDPMER-series from the other models. Hence, if the MESSAGE GDPMER-series do not 
represent real economic growth, neither do the other GDPMER-series. 
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5 Does the B1 scenario represent a lower limit? 
This section provides a short discussion related to the question raised by C&H on whether the 
B1 scenario, which is the SRES scenario with the lowest cumulative emissions, represents a 
lower limit with respect to future emissions of GHGs. It is our view that this has to be 
approached through a look at the development of some basic variables, such as population 
growth, average real economic growth, energy intensities and the share of fossil fuels in 
global energy supply. In this section we go beyond the discussion related to conversion 
factors and provide a short overview and discussion of a number of some basic assumptions 
in the B1 scenario. 
In this regard it can be useful to draw attention to some relevant key variables related to this 
discussion, cf. figure 1. This figure shows, first, the considerable degree of emission intensity 
improvements that are assumed to take place in all regions in the B1 scenario during the 
coming century. It is difficult to judge whether this represents a lower limit or not. Although 
there is a considerable degree of convergence of emission intensities between regions (both in 
absolute and relative terms), the low emission intensities in Middle East, Africa and Latin 
America (the ALM-region) and in Asia compared to OECD in 2100 are perhaps somewhat 
surprising. 
Figure 1 shows how fossil fuels from the middle of the century gradually are replaced by 
mainly biomass and other renewables in addition to nuclear energy. However, even by the 
end of the century the global fossil fuel consumption is only slightly below current levels. It 
might be reasonable to question whether the B1 scenario really represents a lower limit in this 
regard. We find it somewhat surprising that fossil fuels, almost 100 years from now, still play 
a crucial role in global energy supply in a scenario that should represent a lower limit with 
respect to CO2 emissions. Obviously, nuclear energy could play a much more prominent role 
if it were found to be socially acceptable. There are other similar model studies where fossil 
fuels have a considerably smaller share of total energy supply by the end of the century, see 
e.g. Nakićenović et al. (1998). 
Figure 1 also shows how income levels develop within the century. There is definitely a 
catching up, although the absolute income differences are enhanced. Again we find it difficult 
to judge whether this is a reasonable lower limit or not. However, for the period 1990–2100 
there is an annual average per capita GDPPPP-growth of 2.7 percent in Asia, 2.5 per cent in the 
ALM region, and 2.0 on a global basis. These are relatively high growth rates. In comparison, 
the corresponding average growth rate of for example the United States in the period 1913–
2001 was 1.9 per cent, according to Maddison (2003).9   
Finally, Figure 1 shows the large differences as regards CO2 emissions in the different 
scenario families. However, although the emissions in the B1 scenario are relatively low 
compared to especially A2, it might be argued that the lower limit could have been even 
lower. Not least the large share of fossil fuels in world energy supply in 2100 could be 
questioned. Moreover, the economic growth rates of the developing countries are relatively 
high. However, as argued by Holtsmark and Alfsen (2005) and Grübler et al. (2004), 
exaggerated economic growth rates do not necessarily imply overstated emission growth. 
 
 
 
 
9 According to Mitchell (1998) the pr cap GNP growth rate in the US for the period 1910-1990 was 1.8 
per cent. 
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Figure 1. The development of some variables in the MESSAGE scenarios. OECD90 
is OECD as of 1990, REF  is the reforming economies, i.e. the former Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, ALM is Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, and ASIA as 
Asia excluding OECD countries. 
6 Conclusions 
Our conclusion is that we agree with C&H when they argue that PPP correction should be 
included in the type of scenario work carried out in SRES. Because relative income and 
emission intensity levels play crucial roles in the scenario design, these levels have to be 
correctly pictured. That can only be done by the use of PPP corrected measures. The choice 
between PPP or MER is far more than a question of "metrics", as claimed by the IPCC. 
On the other hand, we reiterate our view that the lack of PPP corrections has not necessarily 
caused exaggerated estimates of emission growth in the SRES. In our view it seems obvious 
that the scenario makers have had two types of gap closure in mind as important driving 
forces. The degree of convergence of the income levels between rich and poor countries, and 
the degree of convergence of the emission intensities are apparently set exogenously. While 
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the use of MER-based measures means overstated income gaps, it also means overstated 
emission intensity gaps. Hence, the scenario makers have probably overestimated the 
economic growth necessary in the process of catching up. Moreover, they have exaggerated 
the potential for emission intensity reductions in the poor parts of the world. These two 
overstatements effectively neutralize each other as far as global emission growth is 
concerned. 
In this article we have also discussed another point in the critique raised by C&H. They 
claimed in their second contribution to the debate (Castles and Henderson, 2003b) that the 
PPP-based series in the MESSAGE-based scenarios in SRES were mislabelled because 
divergence between the GDP measures for the developed and the developing regions “are 
impossibly great”. (p 423, first paragraph.) This is related to the claim from C&H that “any 
difference between them can only arise from the use of different weighting systems.” (p 422, 
third paragraph). In fact, however, there might be another important source of difference 
between the two types of series in question:  how the MER series are defined. The MER 
series could either be based on constant exchange rates taken from one specific base year, or 
on current (changing) exchange rates. This division is common in statistics; cf. for example 
OECD (2004), which sets out both types of MER-based series. It is not specified in IPCC 
(2000) whether the MER series are based on current or constant exchange rates. However, the 
high degree of convergence between the MER-based and the PPP-based series makes it 
reasonable to believe the MER-based series are based on changing (current or nominal) 
exchange rates. If that is the case, the divergences are not “impossibly great.” Hence, we 
conclude that the PPP-series as presented in SRES (IPCC, 2000) are plausible. 
On the other hand, this means that the MER-based series do no represent real economic 
growth, but are influenced by changing exchange rates. If this really is the case, it should have 
been made clear in presentations of the scenarios. As it now stands, the MER-based series 
represent nominal economic growth and are, consequently, quite misleading. 
Our final point is related to the question of whether it is reasonable to consider the B1 
scenarios to represent a lower limit with respect to emissions. We have definitely no basis for 
any firm conclusions at this point. However, we note that this discussion has to go beyond the 
question of whether to use PPP or MER. We have pointed out some key variables that should 
be analysed with regard to this question. We especially think that the share of fossil fuels in 
the global energy supply in the B1 scenarios might be questioned. On the other hand, the 
considerable drop in energy intensities might be too optimistic.    
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